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In a letter to his friend Iasites (Sathas 171), Michael Psellos proposes that he give the letter itself in exchange for a horse. 
Exploiting the polysemy of alogon and logos in Greek, Psellos is able to frame this playful representation of a gift 
exchange in a philosophical opposition between materiality and reason. This allows him to present his intellectual 
competences as an exclusive kind of cultural capital that deserves material support from other members of society. 
 
Don‖t look a gift horse in the mouth1! Michael Psellos, the famous author and statesman of the eleventh 
century, could have had this commonsense saying in mind when about to receive a horse (in fact, a mule) 
from a friend of his: he requited his friend with another present. This should not surprise us: gifts such as 
flowers, fruit, perfumes and animals circulated among letter-writing Byzantines2. What is special about this 
particular gift exchange is the nature of Psellos‖ gift: nothing more and nothing less than the letter itself. 
Words are all he has to offer.  
 In this study, I shall read this letter as part of a discourse which aims to underpin the validity of an 
exchange of cultural goods in return for material ones. Words are not only words in this argument: they are 
logos, that word with so many philosophical, religious and socio-cultural overtones. The horse plays its own 
role: its name, alogon, can conveniently be opposed to logos, thus triggering a playful, and perhaps unusually 
explicit, enunciation of the exchange between cultural and material goods.  
The argument of the letter 
In essence, Psellos‖ letter is intended to thank his friend Iasites for a mule which he is about to give3. But the 
elaborate word play used turns it into a discussion about rationality and irrationality, which is indeed how the 
letter was described in the invaluable project ―Prosopography of the Byzantine World‖4. Iasites, the addressee, 
is known to us from some other letters of Psellos. In one of them, he is addressed with the title of kouropalates; 
in another, he is described as a joyful companion5. The letter is tentatively dated to 1067 in the PBW, which is 
                                                     
1 This study has greatly profited from the advice and suggestions of Kristoffel Demoen. I am also grateful to the anonymous 
referees for their valuable and insightful comments. 
2 H. Hunger, Die Hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner, II [Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft ; Abt. 12, Teil 5] 
(München 1978) 231-232, and A. Karpozelos, ―Realia in Byzantine Epistolography X-XIIc‖, BZ 77 (1984) 20-37. 
3 The letter is edited in K. Sathas, Μεςαιωνικὴ βιβλιοθήκη, V (Paris / Venice 1876) 434-438 (letter 171). It is briefly 
mentioned in Karpozelos, ―Realia‖ 27-28, where it is implied that Psellos asks for a mule because he could not handle a 
horse. This might not be wholly correct: Psellos asks for a mule that is not too young and rash (cf. infra). 
4 ―Narrative unit: Psellos sent Iasites a discussion of the rational & irrational, why only the horse among animals is alogon‖, 
Prosopography of the Byzantine World <http://www.pbw.kcl.ac.uk>, accessed 16 January 2009.  
5 Michael Psellos, Scripta Minora, ed. E. Kurtz  - F. Drexl, II (Milano 1941) 7-8 (letter 6 ; this edition is hereafter referred to as 
―Kurtz-Drexl‖), and P. Gautier, ―Quelques lettres de Psellos inédites ou déjà éditées‖, REB 44 (1986) 111-197 (letter 25). See 
―Anonymus 2297‖, PBW. 
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plausible in view of historical data mentioned in the other letters where Iasites appears, but this dating can 
only be approximate. 
Below, I first present the thread of argumentation that the letter develops, by translating the most 
relevant fragments and paraphrasing the rest. I try to describe the sense of the argumentation not only for its 
first reader, Iasites, but also for its implied readers, contemporary Byzantines steeped in classical reading. As 
the letter is deliberately equivocal and sometimes desperately vague, my translation of some words fluctuates 
depending on the prominence that one sense takes over the other, but sometimes I had to resort to leaving 
the Greek words as they were. While philosophical notions are surely omnipresent, I have only elucidated 
them as far as they were needed to follow the argument. Nor do I mean to lay bare every intertextual allusion. 
For such studies, the future full edition of Psellos‖ letters by Stratis Papaioannou will surely mark a new 
starting point.  
The equivocation in which the letter indulges becomes manifest from its very first words: 
Ἄλογον ὡρ ἀληθ῵ρ, ςεβαςμιψσάση μοι κευαλὴ Ἰαςίσα, εἰ λόγοτ βοτλοίμην ἀνσαλλάσσεςθαι 
ἄλογον, ὥςπεπ μελίνην ἀνσὶ πτποῦ, ἢ χίανθον ἀνσὶ ξτςσίδορ, ἢ βύπςαν ἀνσὶ φπτςοπάςσοτ 
ςσολῆρ. 
It would be ―alogical‖ indeed, my revered friend Iasites, if I would exchange logos for alogon, just 
like corn for millet, or a robe for a mat, or a gold-woven garment for a skin. 
The first instance of the word alogon would be recognized by Iasites as referring to his gift, the mule, 
which Psellos equates here, as he does virtually throughout, with a horse. In vernacular medieval Greek, as in 
modern Greek, ἄλογο(ν) means ―horse‖6, whereas in ancient Greek, the adjective ἄλογορ had the general 
meaning ―without logos‖, that is, ―without reason‖, or ―without speech‖. Psellos, who elsewhere avoids 
vernacular words or significations as much as any other highbrow Byzantine author, makes a notable 
exception here for the sake of word play. The following words, ὡρ ἀληθ῵ρ, reinforce the pun: the proposition 
that Psellos makes in this sentence about ―aloga‖ is found to be truly ―alogical‖. Word play is in this letter no 
mere verbal entertainment, but forms the heart of the rhetorical argumentation of the letter.  
The second instance of the word alogon has a different function; here, it is opposed to its counterpart 
logos. A cultivated Byzantine reader would instantly recognize this juxtaposition as the opposition of 
rationality versus irrationality within the human soul; in this opposition, rationality (mostly referred to by the 
word logikon, as elsewhere in this letter) is always understood to be the superior part. This opposition was 
present in Greek thinking even before Plato7, and was elaborated on not only by Plato himself but also by 
other influential authors such as Aristotle, and Plutarch8. Christianity readily adopted this conception of the 
soul, and it is presented as such in some basic texts within the Christian tradition9. Psellos also expressed this 
antagonism in some of his compilatory philosophical writings10. The quality of λογικόρ, by extension, not only 
                                                     
6 See E. Kriaras, Λεξικὸ σῆρ μεςαιωνικῆρ ἑλληνικῆρ δημώδοτρ γπαμμασείαρ 1100-1669, Τόμορ Α᾿ (Thessaloniki 1969) 235. 
7 W. W. Fortenbaugh, ―On the antecedents of Aristotle's bipartite psychology‖, GRBS 11 (1970) 233-250. 
8 Plato, Respublica 439d, Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea 1102a-b, Plutarch, Moralia 442a, etc.  
9 John Damascene, Expositio fidei, ed. Kotter (Berlin / New York 1973), §26, l. 92-93: Χπὴ γινώςκειν, ὅσι σὸ λογικὸν υύςει 
κασάπφει σοῦ ἀλόγοτ· διαιποῦνσαι γὰπ αἱ δτνάμειρ σῆρ χτφῆρ εἰρ λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον. 
10 See e.g. the fragments De anima et mente and Στλλογαὶ διάυοποι καὶ ποικίλαι in Michael Psellos, Philosophica Minora, ed. D. J. 
O'Meara, II (Leipzig 1989) 2 and 30 (op. 2 and 13). These writings, even their wording, owe very much to Philoponos' 
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refers to ―rational‖ in this philosophico-religious discourse, but also to ―spiritual‖, as opposed to ―material‖, and 
to ―intellectual‖11. Psellos switches back and forth between these three significations, often shifting smoothly 
from properties of the human soul in general to properties and dispositions of different individuals. 
In view of the gift exchange that Psellos and Iasites perform here, it is clear that an additional word 
play is intended in this opposition, whereby the alogon – logos pair has a very concrete level of signification: 
alogon would be understood as the horse that Iasites gives, and logos refers to the gift that Psellos gives in 
return. In this way, the first sentence opens up a kind of playful competition between Psellos and Iasites about 
the question of which gift is worth more. In this competition, Psellos directly overbids his opponent by stating 
that the exchange is ill balanced. 
The letter continues as follows (434.29-435.12): 
Εἰ δὲ καὶ υιλόςουόρ σιρ θείη σὸ φπῆμα, ἀλλ᾿ ὅμψρ ἐμποπικόν· καὶ πολλοί γε φείπονα μὲν 
κπεισσόνψν κασά γε σὸ ποιὸν ἀνσαλλάσσονσαι, σῶ δὲ ὑπεπβάλλονσι σῆρ ποςόσησορ 
κεπδαλεώσεπόν πψρ αὐσοῖρ σὸ σῆρ ἀνσαμείχεψρ γίνεσαι· ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν αὐσὴν σὴν σοῦ λόγοτ 
ςσέπηςιν σῆρ λογικῆρ ἀνσηλλασσόμην ἕξεψρ καὶ δτνάμεψρ, ἄσοπόρ σιρ ἂν εἴην καὶ οὐ υιλόςουορ. 
Νῦν δὲ οὐ ςσέπηςιρ ὃ ἀνσιλαμβάνψ σὸν λόγον διδούρ, ἀλλ᾿ οὐςία σιρ ὑποςσασική, φεῖπον μὲν καὶ 
οὕσψ σῆρ ἐν ἐπιςσολαῖρ λογιόσησορ, αὐθύπαπκσον δὲ ὅμψρ ππᾶγμα καὶ οὐ ςσέπηςιρ ἕξεψρ. Εἶσα, εἰ 
μὲν πανσὸρ σοῦ ἐν ἐμοὶ λόγοτ ἠλασσόμην σὸ ἀνσικείμενον, εἶφέ σινά μοι μέμχιν ἡ ἄμειχιρ· ἐπεὶ 
δέ, ὥςπεπ πηγῆρ σὸ ἀποφεσετόμενον οὐκ ἐλασσοῖ σὴν ἀπφὴν ἀυ᾿ ἧρ σὸ ῥεῖθπον, οὕσψ δὴ κἀμοὶ σὸ 
γπαμμάσιον. Καὶ ἐὰν ἐλάσσψ σὸν λόγον ποιῇ, οὐ παπὰ σοῦσο μεμπσέορ ἐγώ, ἢ ἐπαινεσέορ, 
πποςκσώμενορ σῶ οἰκείῳ καὶ σὸ ἀλλόσπιον, ἵν᾿ ἔφψ σὸ μέν, ὄφημα σῆρ χτφῆρ, σὸ δέ, σοῦ ςώμασορ·  
But nevertheless, even if a philosopher were to consider this transaction, it would remain a 
commercial one. To be sure, many people give things that are better in quality in exchange for 
worse things, but thanks to the greater quantity of those things, their act of exchange becomes 
for them more profitable in a certain way.  But if I accepted nothing less than the deprivation of 
my logos in exchange for my intellectual (logikos) disposition and capacity, I would be a fool and 
not a philosopher. Now, however, it is not a deprivation that I accept by giving my logos, but a 
real thing. Even this way, it [this thing] may be inferior to refined letter-writing, but nonetheless 
it stands on its own, and it is not a deprivation of my disposition. Further, if I exchanged all the 
logos I have for its opposite, there would be some blame involved for me in this exchange. But 
just as water drawn off from a source does not lessen the origin from where the stream comes, 
so is it exactly with my letter. And if it [this letter] lessens my logos, I am not to blame for that ; 
rather I am to be praised, because as well as what is my own, I receive something belonging to 
another, so that I have on the one hand a carriage for my soul, and on the other hand a carriage 
for my body. 
 
Here, Psellos explains why the exchange, dismissed in the first sentence, is nevertheless an honourable 
transaction. It would not be so, if Psellos gave away for naught his superior quality of possessing logos. But in 
this case he gets something in return that is tangible, and in addition, his words have a source that is 
inexhaustible, unlike material commodities, which, when given away, are lost to the giver. 
The expressions ―σῆρ ἐν ἐπιςσολαῖρ λογιόσησορ‖ and ―γπαμμάσιον‖ (435.7-8 and 12) clarify for the 
uninitiated reader—but surely not for Iasites or other insiders—the notion of logos that has hitherto remained 
vague: the thing that Psellos exchanges for Iasites‖ horse is nothing more than a letter. Thus the word logos 
                                                                                                                                                                      
commentary on Aristotle's De anima, as the editor remarks. 
11 See LPG, s.v. ―λογικόρ‖, significations A. rational; B. comprehensible by reason, logical; C. spiritual. 
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acquires different meanings dependent on its juxtaposition with alogon: it refers to a letter (in opposition to a 
horse), and to rationality (in opposition to irrationality). In many instances however, it can mean or connote 
both; and when Psellos speaks about a logikos disposition within him, he refers to an ability to create logoi like 
this letter, hence to an ―intellectual‖ disposition. In the last sentence, the ―carriage for my body‖ refers 
unequivocally to the horse, played out in an antithesis to logos, which is described as a ―carriage for the soul‖12. 
 Psellos then announces that he is going to give this small issue larger dimensions by joining rhetoric 
with philosophy. He proceeds to embark upon a philosophically styled description of how rationality (referred 
to with the more precise term logikon, see 435.19) and irrationality (alogon) are to be found in everyone. 
However, as Psellos argues, this general statement does not prevent his own intellectual abilities from being 
peculiar and superior. Since Psellos shifts here from general psychology to relative properties of people, I have 
chosen to represent this dichotomy as ―spiritual‖ and ―material‖ in the translation below (435.20-29): 
Τὸ μὲν λογικόν, ἶςον παπ᾿ ἀμυοσέποιρ καὶ ὅμοιον, σὸ δέ γε λόγιον παπ᾿ ἑκασέπῳ μὲν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ κασ᾿ 
ἴςην μοῖπαν, ἀλλ᾿ ὥςπεπ ἐν ζτγοῖρ σπτσάνηρ ἡ ἐμὴ πλάςσιγξ βαπτσέπα σῆρ ςῆρ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ αὐσὸρ 
ἄνθεςι λόγοτ ςεμνύνῃ καὶ ζηλοῖρ σὴν ὥπαν σ῵ν λέξεψν, ἢν μὴ ἀποσίκσῃρ οὕσψρ, ἀλλὰ σοὺρ 
ἀλλοσπίοτρ μέν, γενναίοτρ δὲ σόκοτρ ὡρ οἰκείοτρ ἀςπάζῃ· οὔσε οὖν αὐσὸρ ἄλογόν σι φπῆμα 
διδοὺρ καὶ λογικὰρ λαμβάνψν φάπισαρ, ἐκσὸρ σῆρ ἀλογίαρ καθίςσαςαι, καὶ μόνον σὸν λόγον 
ἐνδέδτςαι, οὔσε δὲ ἐγώ, οὕσψ διδοὺρ καὶ λαμβάνψν ἀλογώσασορ μόνον γίνομαι· ἀλλ᾿ ἔςσιν αὖθιρ 
παπ᾿ ἀμυοσέποιρ ἀμυόσεπα. 
The faculty of reasoning (logikon) is the same and equally present in both of us. The learned 
(logios) part may also be present in both of us, but not in equal amounts: just as in the beams of a 
balance, my scale is heavier than yours, since you too take pride in the flowerings of language 
and strive after beauty of style, although you do not yourself give birth to these but rather 
embrace the noble offspring of others as if they were your own. So, if you give some material 
(alogon) thing and receive intellectual (logikas) charms in return, that does not mean that you 
escape from materiality (alogia) and are dressed only in spirituality (logos), nor do I become, by 
giving and receiving, merely material (alogotatos): both properties remain present in both of us. 
Psellos here makes a distinction between two manifestations of logos in people. One of these, logikos, 
the propriety of having reason and language, is present in everyone, but the other, logios, being learned, is 
reserved for only a few people, a distinction that is bound to remain so. While Iasites may possess logos, he 
does not have the ability to create things that possess the charms of powerful discourse; he can only 
appropriate them, and this is exactly what Psellos proposes he do in this letter. The specifically literary 
properties of the logos that Psellos bestows on it are expressed clearly by the specifications ―flowerings of 
language‖ and ―beauty of style‖.  
The philosophically styled representation of the soul as a mixture of rational and irrational parts 
continues. It is  stressed that every soul partakes of both and that ―reason (logos), just as a ruler or emperor, 
needs the service of the lesser upon which to mount and ride‖ (436.6-7: δεῖ γὰπ σῶ λόγῳ ὥςπεπ δεςπόσῃ καὶ 
βαςιλεῖ ὑπεπηςίαρ σῆρ φείπονορ, ἐυ‖ ἧρ ὀφήςεσαι καὶ ἱππάςεσαι). The imagery here used represents the 
irrational part of our soul as a horse, an image on which the following sentences elaborate. The notion that 
                                                     
12 This expression goes back to Plato, Timaeus (see 41c and 69c), and is elaborated on in the psychological theories of Neo-
platonic philosophers when addressing the relation of mind to body; it is also dear to Psellos, see: Michael Psellos, Oratoria 
Minora, ed. A. Littlewood (Leipzig 1985) 11, line 9 (or.4), referring to ―body‖, and Philosophica minora, II, 23, l. 10-11 (op. 11) in 
a more ―Proclean‖, spiritual sense. The idea of λόγορ as a ―carriage for the soul‖ is, however, unique, as far as I can see. 
5 
 
the irrational part should serve reason is in line with earlier influential philosophical and theological treatises 
about the soul and was also familiar to Psellos13. Thereafter, the different elements within the alogon are listed 
(senses, desire, etc.) in terms somewhat similar to those from Aristotle's De anima14. Psellos stresses once again, 
however, that this communication between the two parts does not entail that they become mixed (436.13-18): 
ἀλλ‖ ὥςπεπ ἵππορ σιθαςςετόμενορ καὶ φπτςοῖρ υαλάποιρ καλλψπιζόμενορ, οὐκ εἰρ κπείσσψ 
ὕπαπξιν μεσασίθεσαι, οὔσε μὴν εἰρ σὴν φείπψ ὁ ἐποφούμενορ σούσῳ ὀλιςθαίνψν σῆρ ἕδπαρ καὶ 
ςτμπασούμενορ, οὕσψρ οὔσε σὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἄλογον, λόγορ ἀκπιβὴρ γένοισ᾿ ἄν ποσε, οὔθ᾿ ὁ λόγορ σῆρ 
ππώσηρ ἐκςσαίη ὑπάπξεψρ καὶ σοῦ υτςικοῦ ἀξιώμασορ. 
But just as a horse that is tamed and is adorned with golden bosses does not change into a higher 
form of existence, nor, indeed, the rider into a lesser when he slips from the saddle and is 
trampled upon, so could the alogon in us never fully become logos, nor could logos ever step aside 
from its first form of existence and its natural rank. 
Notwithstanding the philosophical discourse that is maintained here, the comparison with a ―real‖ 
horse and the use of verbs from the sphere of horse-riding to denote the servitude of the irrational part of our 
soul ensure that the underlying connotation of ―horse‖ for alogon is not forgotten. In the comparison, even the 
unequivocal word ἵππορ is used, for the first time in this letter.  
The image of the horse has a firm tradition in philosophical theories about the human soul. Every 
Byzantine reader familiar with Platonic philosophy would inevitably call to mind Plato‖s allegory of the soul in 
the Phaedrus, where reason as a charioteer tames the irrational parts of our soul, represented as a pair of 
horses15. As a result, the Platonic horse develops into the cornerstone of Psellos‖ equivocation centred around 
alogon. Ironically, Psellos‖ use of the metaphor elucidates, through the aid of philosophy, the properties of a 
tangible horse, instead of the other way round.  
 Psellos then returns to the assertion that neither logos nor alogon can change into its opposite, but this 
time he links the philosophical relation between the two to the exchange that he and Iasites are performing 
(436.22-25): 
Δεῖ δὲ ἀμυοσέποιρ θασέποτ μέποτρ· ἐμοὶ μὲν, σῶ λογίῳ εἴποι σιρ ἂν ἴςψρ καὶ υιλοςόυῳ, σῆρ 
ὑπεπειδούςηρ ἀλόγοτ δτνάμεψρ, καὶ ςοὶ σῶ ἥσσονα σῆν λογιόσησα ἔφονσι, σῆρ λογικψσέπαρ 
ὑπάπξεψρ. 
Both parts need each other: I, who some may perhaps call learned and a philosopher, need 
material power to support me; and you, having less learnedness, need a more intellectual 
(logikos) faculty. 
I translate here the adjective λογικόρ with ―intellectual‖, because at this point the opposition logos - 
alogon is reduced to a distinction between the intellectual (again, the connection with logios, learned is made), 
and the ―normal‖ person, whose task it is to materially support the intellectual. They can give δύναμιρ, the 
                                                     
13 Michael Psellos, De Omnifaria Doctrina, ed. L. Westerink (Nijmegen 1948), 49, §81, and Psellos‖ encomium for his mother in 
Sathas, Μεςαιωνικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη, V, 34. 
14 See e.g. De Anima 413b-414b, where Aristotle makes the connection between sensible things, sensory impressions, 
opinions, and desires.  
15 Plato, Phaedrus 246a-254e. Psellos was very familiar with this image; he even devoted an exegetical work to it, entitled 
἖ξήγηςιρ σῆρ Πλασψνικῆρ ἐν σῶ Φαίδπῳ διυπείαρ σ῵ν χτφ῵ν καὶ  ςσπασείαρ σ῵ν θε῵ν, ed. Philosophica Minora, II, 12-14 
(op. 7). 
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effect of an action, while the intellectual can give (or rather: can allow someone to take part in) his ὕπαπξιρ, 
his innate faculty. 
Pursuing the horse metaphor, Psellos states that Iasites, as a noble soul, needs the reins of reason 
(436.31: σοῦ λογικοῦ φαλινοῦ). Then the distinction between a general and a specific intellectual faculty is 
made again: while Iasites has logos by nature, Psellos possesses another kind of logos, one that is able to glide 
into the soul and lead it towards the understanding of the ―better things‖. This latter kind is more helpful than 
the natural logos (437.6-13): 
Ὁ μὲν γὰπ βλοςτπόρ σιρ δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἀυίηςι κάλλη, οὐδὲ ἀκσινοβολεῖ φάπισαρ, ἀλλ᾿ ἔςσι 
δτςπαπάδεκσόρ σε καὶ δτςοιώνιςσορ· ὁ δέ, ὥςπεπ ἄνθορ ἐςσὶν ὥπαρ ἐαπινῆρ, καὶ ὑπάγεσαι σὸν 
ἀκποασήν, εἰκόσψρ ἑλκόμενον σῶ θελκσηπίῳ σῆρ φάπισορ. Εἰ δὲ πολλοὶ ππὸρ σὴν ἠφὼ σοῦ λόγοτ 
κψυεύοτςιν, ἀλλά ςοί γε ππὸρ σαύσην σὰ ὦσα ἀνεῴγαςι καὶ ἑςσήκαςι, καὶ οὐδέν ςε σ῵ν πάνσψν 
οὕσψρ ἡδύνει ὡρ λέξιρ φαπίεςςα καὶ ςτνθήκη λόγοτ ἐμμελεςσάσην ἁπμονίαν κληπψςαμένη. 
The first kind [of logos] seems somehow coarse, and does not impart any beauty, nor does it 
shine forth with grace: it is hard to accept and hard to interpret16. The other kind, however, is 
like a flower in spring: it brings the listener, who is rightly attracted by the charms of grace, 
under its power. Most people, however, remain deaf to the sound of literature (logos); but your 
ears are open to it and remain still for it, and there is nothing that delights you so much as 
graceful style and a literary composition that has inherited a most melodious harmony.  
Psellos makes here a distinction between logos as natural, plain discourse, and a special kind of 
discourse that is more attractive17. The distinction makes clear that the logos that Psellos claims to be giving 
comes closer to what we would call ―literature‖: it is a graceful and rhetorically effective kind of discourse.  
The predilection of Iasites for this more sophisticated side of logos is for Psellos the occasion to offer 
him an erudite digression. This is an etymological explanation of why, of all animals, only the horse is called 
alogon, even though every animal is alogon in the sense that it has no language (438.7: λόγορ υτςικόρ). The 
reason that Psellos gives is that the horse corresponds to the irrational part of our soul that needs to be tamed. 
A horse is a kind of second alogon, because, just as the passions and emotions in our soul have to be tamed by 
our rational part, so the horse was the first animal to be tamed by the only rational animal, and for that reason 
it came to be named after irrationality. Psellos‖ explanation, which is idiosyncratic as far as I can see, is in fact 
a backward etymology: whereas the metaphor of the horse in Plato clarifies the way we have to understand 
the irrationality in our soul, the causal relation works for Psellos in the opposite direction. 
 After this digression, Psellos proceeds to the conclusion of his letter (438.17-21):  
Ἆπ᾿ οὐφὶ μτπίψν ἀλόγψν ἀνσάξιορ ἡ ἐπιςσολή, ἀδελυὲ υίλσασε; ἀλλ᾿  ἡμεῖρ ἑνὸρ σαύσην 
ἀνσαλλασσόμεθα, ἔςσψ δὲ σοῦσο μήσ᾿ ὄνορ, μήθ᾿ ἵππορ ἄππην, ἀλλ᾿ ὥςπεπ ὁ παπὰ σοῖρ ἰασποῖρ 
ἡμισπισαῖορ ςύνθεσόρ ἐςσιν ἐξ ἀυημεπινοῦ ςτνεφοῦρ σπισαίοτ διαλείπονσορ, οὕσψ δὴ καὶ σοῦσο 
ἡμίονορ εἴη. 
Is my letter not worth a thousand horses, my dearest friend? I have, however, exchanged it for 
only one18! And it shall not be an ass, nor a male horse, but just as in the domain of physicians a 
                                                     
16 LSJ, s.v. δτςοιώνιςσορ give the translation ―ill-omened‖, but I think Psellos takes it to mean ―hard to take an omen from‖. 
17 He makes a similar distinction in another letter; see Sathas, Μεςαιωνικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη, 242-3, letter 11. 
18 The text is problematic here: normally, as elsewhere in the letter, the verb ἀνσαλλάσσομαι is followed by an accusative 
denoting the object that one receives in exchange and a genitive for the object that is given in exchange. Here the opposite 
is the case. 
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―semi-tertian‖ fever is compounded of an intermittent tertian and a continual quotidian fever, so 
shall this thing be a mule, a ―semi-ass‖.  
Psellos does not miss the opportunity to drop in some technical medical terminology here, clearly 
taken from Galen (or one of his compilers)19. It is striking that once again he advances a backward 
etymological explanation: Galen explains the term ―semi-tertian‖ by using the example of the mule, whereas 
Psellos does the opposite. 
Here, Psellos finally reveals what his missive boils down to: Iasites should give him a mule. The 
imperative and optative mood and future tenses used in connection with the mule imply that the mule is not 
yet given. Requests for donations specifically of horses or mules are frequent in Byzantine letter-writing20. The 
most probable scenario is that Psellos describes here the animal he wants in response to an earlier proposal 
from Iasites that he give him a mule. 
Psellos further specifies that the colour is not important but that the mule should be of a quiet nature, 
not too wild, since our armchair scholar has often been thrown out of the saddle. The letter closes with a pun 
that for a last time exploits the polysemy of alogon: it should in fact not be too alogon (here carrying the 
meaning of ―unreasonable‖).  
Κἂν εἰ μεσπίψν ἐσ῵ν εἴη, μὴ μένσοι πολλ῵ν, οὐδὲ σοῦσό μοι ἀλτςισελέρ, ἧσσον γὰπ οὕσψρ ἕξει σὸ 
ἄλογον. ἖γὼ γὰπ μεσπίψρ ἄλογον ὑποσάξαι δύναμαι σαῖρ φεπςίν, ἀλογώσασον δὲ καὶ θπαςύσασον 
οὔ μοι δύναμιρ σῶ φαλινῶ ἀνσιςπᾷν. 
And if it would be of middle age—but not too old! —that would be of convenience to me, because 
that way it is less unreasonable (alogon). For I can subdue an averagely unreasonable alogon, but I 
have not the strength to hold in check with the reins one that is all too rash and alogon. 
Exchange in letter-writing  
This letter is permeated by the terminology of exchange. The transaction between Iasites and Psellos to which 
the letter pertains is referred to with the terms ἀνσαλλάσσεςθαι (434.27, 435.2 and passim), ἀνσιλαμβάνψ 
(435.6, 436.21), ἄμειχιρ (435.10), ἀνσάμειχιρ (435.3), and the pair δίδψμι – λαμβάνψ (435.25-28). The main 
argument of the letter focuses on the question of whether the two gifts are of equal value (438.17: ἀνσάξιορ) 
and whether exchanging them is legitimate. 
It is perhaps indicative of the conscious elaboration of this theme that this letter has a particular 
place in the letter collection: it forms part of a small series of letters which concentrate on exchange and 
reward21. The weighing of the mutual gifts is an element of a playfully conducted competition that recurs in 
                                                     
19 See the striking resemblance of expression in Galen‖s De differentiis febrium, edited in Galen, Opera omnia, ed. C. G. Kühn, 
VII (Leipzig 1821-1833) 358. 
20 Karpozelos, ―Realia‖, 27-28. 
21 This is only a hypothesis, based on the fact that both the preceding and the following letter in the edition of  Sathas 
explore these themes. These letters follow upon each other in their original sequence in the manuscript Paris. Gr. 1182. 
Letter 168, also positioned nearby in the manuscript, is the more famous letter to a schoolteacher not satisfied with the 
gift of money Psellos had given to him. See P. Gautier, ―Deux manuscrits pselliens: le Parisinus Graecus 1182 et le 
Laurentianus Graecus 57-40‖, REB 44 (1986) 45-110, here 78. There is not much known about the principles of collections of 
Psellos' letters, see E. Papaioannou, ―Das Briefcorpus des Michael Psellos: Vorarbeiten zu eine kritischen Neuedition‖, JÖB 48 
(1998) 67-116. On the difficulty of discerning principles of Byzantine collections of letters in general, see M. Mullett, 
Theophylact of Ochrid. Reading the Letters of a Byzantine Archbishop (Aldershot 1997), 19-20.  Letter 168, also positioned nearby 
in the manuscript, is the more famous letter to a schoolteacher not satisfied with the gift of money Psellos had given to 
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other Byzantine letters which reflect on the question of communication and letter exchange22. It was a topos in 
epistolography that gifts were accepted with some reluctance, since it was the letter itself that was supposed 
to be the eagerly awaited precious object23.  
It should be mentioned that this topos, with the same pun on aloga versus logoi, appears in a letter by 
Ioannes Mauropous (letter 37): Mauropous accepts with some protestation a materially valuable gift, 
remarking that it means nothing to him compared with logoi (l. 10-11: σί γὰπ σὰ ἄλογα ππὸρ σοὺρ λόγοτρ;). 
Karpozelos infers from this sentence that in this case too the gift in question is a horse24. I would add that the 
subsequent phrase in Mauropous‖ letter, ὡρ σὰ ἄφτπα ππὸρ σὸν ςῖσον, a biblical allusion (Jer. 23.28), also echoes 
the beginning of Psellos‖ letter. A form of imitation between these two intellectuals, linked by the bonds of a 
teacher-student relationship and a lifelong (but sometimes troubled) friendship, is indeed likely. 
 As letters themselves form a priori part of an exchange system, it should not surprise us that Psellos 
often uses the image of exchange or commercial transaction when he speaks about himself and his addressee 
exchanging letters25. But on some occasions, letters are exchanged for more mundane objects. In a letter to the 
patriarch of Antioch26, Psellos gently rebukes his addressee for thinking his debt has been paid off by just one 
letter. He takes on the role of tax collector, asking for more friendly words. He then switches to more practical 
matters. He has interceded with some monks on the patriarch‖s behalf. Rightly so, Psellos argues: just as the 
patriarch owes him his fatherly love and attachment, so does Psellos requite him (p. 165, l. 27: ἀνσιδίδψμι) 
with spiritual debts, such as respect and help by means of his eloquence. At the end of the letter, he sums up 
the balance of exchange: the patriarch has paid off two debts of the three he owes to Psellos: the ―golden‖ and 
the ―black‖,  gold referring to money and black to ink, i.e. to letters. The third kind is only hinted at obliquely, 
but I suspect he asks for a garment, a speciality of Antioch. By bringing together these kinds of assets—
cultural, social and material—Psellos confirms that they work as kinds of capital that are interchangeable. 
In other letters, Psellos presents his eloquence more explicitly as a commodity that can be exchanged 
for other kinds of commodities. A common way to exploit this theme is to juxtapose words (logoi) with deeds 
(erga, or pragmata). One letter to an unknown addressee is perfectly clear in this regard, and also implies that 
Psellos‖ logoi may enhance the latter‖s social renown:  
So, let us in a certain way requite each other, and be reciprocally affected, me by giving words, 
you by giving me back deeds. (…) I have opened up with my mouth the sources of words in your 
favour, and you gush over me with your benevolence in a still greater stream, and by both, the 
bowl of friendship will become filled27. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
him.  
22 M. Mullett, ―The Classical Tradition in the Byzantine Letter‖, in M. Mullett and R. Scott (eds.), Byzantium and the Classical 
Tradition, Papers of the Thirteenth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies (Oxford 1981) 75-93, here 81. 
23 Karpozelos, ―Realia‖, 20-21. 
24 A. Karpozelos, The Letters of Ioannes Mauropous, Metropolitan of Euchaita (Thessalonike 1990), 128 (translation) and 230 
(commentary).  
25 See for instance a letter to Aristenos, edited in Gautier, Lettres inédites, 173-175 (letter 24), where Psellos avers that letters 
can be exchanged for letters, just like clothes for clothes (l. 14-15: λόγορ γὰπ λόγοτ ἀνσιλαμβάνεσαι ὥςπεπ ὑυάςμασορ 
ὕυαςμα). 
26 Kurtz-Drexl, II, 164-6 (letter 138). 
27 Gautier, Lettres inédites, 184-5 (letter 31), l.  8-10 : Τπόπον οὖν σινα ἀνσιδπ῵μεν ἀλλήλοιρ καὶ ἀνσιπάςφομεν, ἐγὼ μὲν 
λόγοτρ διδούρ, ςὺ δὲ ἔπγα ἀνσιδιδούρ, and l. 15-17: ἖γὼ μὲν  ππὸρ σὰρ ὑπὲπ ςοῦ σ῵ν λόγψν πηγὰρ ἀνεςσόμψμαι, ςὺ δὲ 
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In another letter, to the bishop of Parnassos,28 he uses almost exactly the same phrasings. The bishop 
has given Psellos cheese, pickled meat and butter in abundance. The thing that Psellos proposes as exchange 
are encomia, because ―I am rich in words, you are rich in things, so we will exchange our own things liberally 
between each other‖29.  
Logos: both inalienable and exchangeable 
The letter to Iasites surely forms part of this rhetoric of ―words for things‖ so common in Psellos‖ letters. 
However, the argument as developed generally in this particular letter is more far-reaching: it paves the way 
for a particular conception of logos, something that deserves a place in an exchange of different kinds of 
assets. 
A first step in this direction is the representation of the notion logos as something that stands above 
mundane, material things. The most important strategy to create this impression is the deliberate blurring of 
the semantic fields of this word, so that it is able to impart all its (positive) philosophical connotations (reason, 
rationality, spirituality, immateriality, etc.).  
The inexhaustibility of this gift is another element that underpins the immateriality of logos. It is 
depicted as an eternally renewable source (435.10-12), and a hexis (435.4-5: σῆρ λογικῆρ ... ἕξεψρ), an innate 
talent that cannot be taken away, because it came with nature (435: οὕσψ γὰπ καὶ ἡ υύςιρ ἡμ῵ν 
ςτμπέπλαςσαι). Psellos repeats this points several times: he can never be deprived of this ability (436.21-22: 
οὔσ᾿ ἐγώ ... κενόρ ποσε γενοίμην σῆρ ἕξεψρ). As a result, logos is not only an immaterial thing but also 
inalienable. 
Having evidenced this elevated nature of logos, Psellos narrows down its definition to make clear that 
the logos he proposes for exchange is not only the technical philosophical notion but also an intellectual 
faculty, of which his letter is a token. He achieves this by connecting logos with the far more specific cognate 
λογιόσηρ, ―learnedness‖ (435.8, 436.24). He also presents himself obliquely, but unmistakably, as a learned 
person, and deduces from this that he possesses more logos than others (436.22-24). In this way, he proceeds 
almost seamlessly from a general philosophical statement to a differentiation of people along intellectual 
criteria. 
A further step towards the understanding of logos as an intellectual, and indeed literary, faculty is 
made by the distinction between two kinds of discourse (436.31-437.13). Opposed to a natural kind of 
discourse, Psellos presents ―his‖ logos as a sophisticated, refined discourse. This logos possesses charis, a key 
notion mentioned thrice (437.7, 9 and 12). These charms are further specified as beautiful style and 
composition (437.12-13), and ―flowerings‖ (435.23, 437.8).  
Moreover, it is implied that this kind of discourse is creative. When Psellos depicts the faculty of 
being logios, this is taken to be a creative version of possessing logos: Psellos partakes of more logos than Iasites 
                                                                                                                                                                      
ἀνθτπεπβλύζειρ σὸ εὐγνψμονεῖν πλείονι ῥεύμασι, καὶ γίνεσαι παπ᾿ ἀλλήλοιρ πλήπηρ ὁ σῆρ υιλίαρ κπασήπ. 
28 Kurtz-Drexl, II, 107 (letter 75). 
29 l. 17-19: ἐγὼ μὲν γὰπ πλοτσ῵ λόγοιρ, ςὺ δὲ πλοτσεῖρ ππάγμαςιν· ἀνσιδώςομεν οὖν ἀλλήλοιρ δαχιλ῵ρ σὰ οἰκεῖα. 
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because he can create literature (435.25: σόκοτρ). The specifically literary qualities of Psellos‖ logos are again 
unequivocally made clear: Iasites admires the flowers of the logos (435.23: ἄνθεςι λόγοτ), and the ―beauty of 
wordings‖ (435.23: σὴν ὥπαν σ῵ν λέξεψν). Again, charis is mentioned (435.26: λογικὰρ φάπισαρ). This stress on 
the creative aspect of Psellos‖ logos , in conjunction with my comments on the translation above, convinces me 
that the logos that Psellos presents here is a creative authorial practice, endowed with the techniques and the 
effects of rhetoric. Therefore, seen from the perspective of the sociology of literature, this letter may be seen 
as an attempt to provide grounds for a material remuneration for literature (in the sense of ―rhetorically 
shaped texts with aesthetic effect on its public‖), while at the same time retaining its overtones of spirituality 
and inalienability. 
However, this kind of exchange entails a particular difficulty. From the beginning, Psellos states that 
it is in fact an impossible exchange because spiritual goods are superior to material things and, in fact, 
inalienable. We touch here on a fundamental issue of how to understand the exchange of cultural for material 
goods30: it is a prevailing ethical prescription that intellectual pursuits such as learning and literature should 
stand above commercial transactions and the baneful influence of money. On other occasions, Psellos asserts 
that he has never sold his lessons for money31 and scoffs at people who study letters with the intention of 
making money out of it, instead of studying it for its own sake32.  
This paradox forms part of a universal set of conceptions by which people conduct and perceive 
transactions involving cultural goods. Both parties (the ―artist‖ and the cultural consumer) agree upon a kind 
of tacit misrecognition of how the exchange of cultural goods works. It is not seen as an exchange at all, but 
rather as a spontaneous act inspired by feelings of friendship and aesthetic admiration. So, the task that 
Psellos set himself is to unite this discourse of the inalienability of logos with the practical need for literary 
services to be recompensed in some way.  
Here again, the philosophical discourse of alogon and logos comes to his aid. The Platonic image of the 
horse, and, inspired by that, the etymological digression, remind the reader of the irrefutable philosophical 
idea that corporeal things should put themselves at the service of spiritual things. But Psellos cleverly makes 
the shift from philosophical ideas towards an idea of cultural exchange. This is achieved through Psellos‖ self-
representation as an intellectual who needs the support of material powers, while Iasites, as a normal person, 
needs help in intellectual matters (436.22-25).  
The same shift is also performed in the section where Psellos describes the forces that the irrational 
part of our soul can deploy for the benefit of logos (436.6-11). These forces are described as senses, opinions, 
and desires. These imply, I would contend, the specific elements that appreciative people like Iasites can 
contribute to do honour to the literary work addressed to them. What Psellos expects from the admiring 
public is that they submit their senses, opinions and desires to the power of his discourse. 
                                                     
30 In this and the following paragraphs, I make use of some concepts and ideas of the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, see 
especially his Le sens pratique (Paris 1980) and Les règles de l’art: Genèse et structure du champ littéraire (Paris 1992). 
31 Michael Psellos, Chronographia, ed. S. Impellizzeri, I (Milano 20055) 290 (book VI, §43). As E. Pietsch, Die Chronographia des 
Michael Psellos: Kaisergeschichte, Autobiographie und Apologie (Wiesbaden 2005) 73 remarks, this is nothing more than 
mimicking the Socrates of Plato‖s Apology. 
32 Psellos, Chronographia I, 40-42 (book I, §29). 
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However, there is also another dimension to this exchange, one that emerges when Psellos describes 
the effects that his discourse can have on its public. Through the ears, it glides unnoticed into the soul (see 
437.2-3, an image not rare in letters concerning mediation33) and thereby ―subdues‖ the listener with its 
charms (437.9). This suggests that Psellos‖ rhetorically competent logos is a tool for effective social 
engineering: mediation through effective eloquence can enhance someone‖s network resources, an important 
asset in a social world dominated by nepotism and favours for friends34. 
We can see, then, that the rhetorical and properly literary qualities of the logos that Psellos proposes 
for exchange are elements that can generate social capital. The exchange is therefore also an exchange of 
social capital in return for material capital; but this social capital is dependent on a specific form of cultural 
capital, that is, rhetorical know-how and literary techniques. 
This letter even allots a place to every participant in this kind of exchange. Most people just remain 
deaf to the literary charms of rhetoric. For them, Psellos reserves the term that is paramount in Greek culture 
to denote the ignorant masses: οἱ πολλοί (437.10). Iasites is set apart from these masses: he has the right 
predisposition to appreciate literature. The language that Psellos uses—the ears that stand open for literature 
(437.11), the sweetening enchantment (437.12: ἡδύνει) that polished discourse exerts—appeals first and 
foremost to the taste he projects in Iasites. But this group of people is still not able to produce literature; they 
can only embrace and love the works of others (435.22-25). Their place in the exchange is therefore to support 
(436.23: ὑπεπειδούςηρ) literature. The true superior elite are the logioi like Psellos, those able to produce 
literature and to give it to others. 
These allocations create bonds as well as exclusions: men who have the ―legitimate‖ tastes and 
competences to engage in such a literary exchange, partake of its grace and profit from its charming power. 
They can claim to belong to a distinctive elite. Others are excluded from the start, as they lack the taste 
necessary to participate in such refined exchanges.  
Even more: the argument works toward the conception that these categories of people are fixed for 
once and all. Repeatedly, Psellos insists that Iasites will remain in his state of alogia, while he himself possesses 
the logikè hexis35. No matter how frequently they engage in exchange, this exchange cannot in any way taint 
Psellos‖ superior status. Hexis is more than just a taste or an action: it is a property that cannot be taken away, 
nor can it be acquired easily by just anyone. We can see here that the cultural capital, consisting of the various 
rhetorical and intellectual competences so valuable for generating social influence, is safeguarded from 
gratuitous intruders by the claim that it is innate and inalienable.  
                                                     
33 See for example Kurtz-Drexl, II, 80-81 (letter 48), in which Psellos confirms to his friend Kalokyros that he has engaged 
all his eloquence to move the emperor to show mercy: ―If there was any charming ode, or a melody gently gliding into the 
ears, chasing the soul unnoticed, I did not neglect it.‖ (r. 13-15). 
34 See H. Ahrweilher, ―Recherches sur la société byzantine au XIe siècle: nouvelles hiérarchies et nouvelles solidarités‖, TM 6 
(1976) 99-124. 
35 This ―capacity for learning‖ (ἕξιν λογιόσησορ) re-occurs in Psellos, Chronographia, I, 282 (book VI, §35), to describe 
Monomachos‖ lack of intellectual abilities. 
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Two horses are not the same 
In order to understand fully the particularity of the exchange that Psellos proposes to Iasites, I would like to 
contrast this letter with another letter of Psellos. Letter 232 in the edition of Kurtz-Drexl36 is directed to 
Psellos‖ influential friend Ioannes Doukas, brother of emperor Konstantinos X Doukas (1059-1067), holding the 
title of kaisar, and an influential figure during his brother‖s reign and that of his cousin Michael VII Doukas 
(1071-1078). The letter begins thus: 
In response to cheese and truffles37, maybe also to oils, sweetmeats and perfumes, my most 
wondrous kaisar, I am able to write letters back and give things in exchange. But in response to a 
horse, so beautiful, great, and docile, so swift and agile, I am at a loss to write a letter of equal 
measure and equal value38.  
In both letters, Psellos discusses with a friend the exchange of a horse for a letter, but the difference 
in argument is striking: while Psellos assures Iasites that his letter is worth so much more than the horse, here 
he declares that no letter will ever be of equal value. Surely this remarkable difference is not due to the fact 
that Iasites‖ horse was in fact a mule, and Ioannes Doukas‖ horse a real horse. Psellos explains the difference 
unmistakably: 
Even though it [the horse] may not be as wonderful or adorned with so many beauties as the 
famous horse of Alexander, (…) but as it is sent me as a gift from a man so formidable that no 
human of old would want to contend with him, how could I by means of words compete with the 
excellence of such a man?39 
The value of the gift does not reside exclusively in the gift, but first and foremost in the status of the 
person who gives it. Evidently, a kaisar stands on a higher social rank than a kouropalates, and Doukas, whom 
Psellos regarded as a patron, outranked Iasites, who stood at an equal or even inferior rank. This hierarchical 
difference determines the value of the gift, more than philosophical assumptions or the intrinsic value of the 
gift itself. Psellos himself acknowledges this fact, not only here but also in other letters: in the letter to the 
patriarch of Antioch discussed above, he says about the patriarch‖s expected share in (letter) exchange that he 
will ―measure it from our shared friendship and determine it from our mutually agreed obligations‖40. 
Therefore, while in both the letters to Iasites and to Ioannes Doukas the discourse of exchange and 
playful competition is maintained, in the letter to the kaisar  Psellos opts to follow a rhetoric of deference 
instead of a rhetoric of arrogant overbidding. Social hierarchy remains the ultimate force behind the way an 
exchange works.  
                                                     
36 Kurtz-Drexl, II, 278-281. 
37 These gifts are mentioned in other letters directed to caesar Ioannes Doukas, e.g. letters 206 and 233 in the edition of 
Kurtz-Drexl. 
38 Kurtz-Drexl, II, 278, l. 19-24: Ππὸρ μὲν στποὺρ καὶ ὕδνα, ἴςψρ δὲ καὶ μύπα καὶ πέμμασα καὶ ἀπώμασα, ὑπεπθαύμαςσέ μοι 
καῖςαπ, ἐπιςσέλλειν καὶ ἀνσαμείβεςθαι δύναμαι· ππὸρ δὲ ἵππον οὕσψ μὲν καλόν, οὕσψ δὲ μέγαν, οὕσψ δὲ σπτυεπόν, οὕσψ δὲ 
σαφὺν καὶ εὐκίνησον ἐπιςσολὴν ἰςόμεσπόν σε καὶ ἰςοδύναμον ποιῆςαι ἀμηφαν῵. 
39 Kurtz-Drexl, II, 278.24-279.3: Εἰ γὰπ καὶ μὴ σοιοῦσορ ἦν μηδὲ σοςούσοιρ ἐκεκόςμησο κάλλεςιν, ὁπόςοιρ ούδ᾿ ὁ σοῦ 
Ἀλεξάνδποτ παπάςημορ ἵππορ (…) ἀλλ᾿ ἐπειδὴ παπὰ σοιούσοτ ἀνδπὸρ δ῵πόν μοι ἀπέςσαλσαι, ὁποίῳ ἂν οὐδεὶρ σ῵ν ἀπ᾿ 
αἰ῵νορ γηγεν῵ν ἀνσεπίςειεν, π῵ρ ἂν διαμιλληςαίμην λόγῳ ππὸρ σὴν σοῦ πέμχανσορ ἀπεσήν; 
40 Kurtz-Drexl, II, 164 (letter 138), l. 17-19: ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ σοῦσον σῇ κοινίᾳ υιλίᾳ παπαμεσπ῵ν καὶ σὰρ ππὸρ ἀλλήλοτρ ςτνθήκαρ 
ςτλλογιζόμενορ μτπίον εἰςππάσσομαι φπέορ ἐπιςσολ῵ν. 
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As a final remark, we should not lose from sight the fact that the primary function of the letter to 
Iasites at the time of sending was to thank a friend for a mule he was about to receive. The historical person 
Iasites may have expected in return not only this letter, but also more tangible help from Psellos, such as 
effective intercession. The philosophically styled argument is at one level just part of a playful competition to 
decide whose gift is the more valuable. Nevertheless, a discourse is created that allows people to accept that 
literature (in its quality of ―crafted discourse‖) can be exchanged for real things, without losing its superior 
qualities. In this respect, the letter to Iasites can be read as the script for the role that rhetorical competences 
should play in society, a script written by one of the most ardent and influential defenders of intellectualism 
in Byzantium. 
